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SECURE COMMUNICATION USING ERROR 
CORRECTION CODES 
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional 
Application No. 61/171,937, filed Apr. 23, 2009, which is 
hereby incorporated by reference. 
FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE 
The present disclosure relates to data communication, and 
more specifically, to a method and system for use in secure 
communication using error correcting codes. 
BACKGROUND 
Error correcting codes are conventionally used to provide 
reliability over a noisy communication channel. An error 
correcting coding scheme transmits extra bits. These extra 
bits allow the receiver to recover errored bits by deducing the 
errored bits from the channel observations of the transmitted 
bits. 
2 
Transmitter llOT and receiver llOR are in communication 
over a main channel 120, which is subject to a noise input 130. 
System 100 also includes another device 140 (an "eaves-
dropper") which is capable oflistening to (eavesdropping on) 
transmissions on main channel 120, over an eavesdropper 
channel 150. Eavesdropper channel 150 is subject to a noise 
input 160. Eavesdropper 140 is passive with respect to main 
channel 120, i.e., eavesdropper 140 does not jam main chan-
nel 120, insert bits on main channel 120, etc. In someembodi-
10 ments, main channel 120 and eavesdropper channel 150 are 
wireless. In one of these embodiments, transmitter llOT 
takes the form of a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag. 
In still other embodiments, main channel 120 and eavesdrop-
15 
per channel 150 are wired (wire line) channels. 
The embodiments described herein utilize specially 
designed LDPC codes to insure communication between 
friendly parties that is both reliable and secure. Use of such 
LDPC codes takes advantage of environments in which the 
signal quality on main channel 120 (the channel between a 
20 "friendly" transmitter and a "friendly" receiver) is better than 
the signal quality on eavesdropper channel 150. This differ-
ence in signal quality may be guaranteed, for example, when 
the eavesdropper is more than a certain distance away from 
the friendly transmitter. 
Error correcting codes are conventionally designed to pro- 25 
vide as much reliability as possible over a noisy channel. 
However, this high level of reliability leads to codes which are 
complex and thus require increased computational resources 
Transmitter llOT includes a reduced security gap encoder 
170, which applies a reduced security gap LDPC code (de-
scribed below) during message transmission. Receiver llOR 
includes a complementary reduced security gap decoder 180, 
so that reduced security gap encoder 170 cooperates with at the receiver. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
Embodiments of the present invention will now be 
described by way of example only with reference to the 
accompanying description. Many aspects of the disclosure 
can be better understood with reference to the following 
drawings. The components in the drawings are not necessar-
ily to scale, emphasis instead being placed upon clearly illus-
trating the principles of the present disclosure. 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a transmitter device and a 
receiver device utilizing non-systematic error correcting 
codes, according to some embodiments described herein. 
FIG. 2 is a graph illustrating the concept of a security gap. 
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of system for iteratively selecting 
an optimized puncturing pattern distribution, according to 
some embodiments. 
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the puncturing algorithm to pro-
duce codes that provide security at finite block lengths, 
according to some embodiments. 
FIG. 5 is a logical block diagram of a system with a secure 
physical layer, according to some embodiments described 
herein. 
FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating selected components 
of a secure physical layer from FIG. 4, according to some 
embodiments described herein. 
FIG. 7 is a hardware block diagram of a device from FIG. 
1, according to some embodiments described herein. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
30 reduced security gap decoder 180 to provide secure commu-
nication over main channel 120. Reduced security gap 
encoder 170 uses puncturing to hide data from eavesdropper 
140, such that all message bits are punctured in reduced 
security gap encoder 170 rather than being transmitted. 
35 Reduced security gap decoder 180 must then deduce the 
message bits from channel observations of those bits that 
were transmitted. As long as the signal quality on eavesdrop-
per channel 150 is low, the channel observations are expected 
to be very noisy. Therefore, reconstruction of the punctured 
40 message bits by a decoder within eavesdropper 140 is 
expected to be hard. The measure of secrecy is the bit-error-
rate (BER) over message bits. 
Consider the scenario in which "friendly" transmitter 11 OT 
wants to transmit an s-bit message Ms to "friendly" receiver 
45 llOR. Transmitter llOT uses an error correcting code to 
encode Ms to an n-bit codeword xn and transmits xn over an 
additive white Gaussian noise (A WGN) channel to receiver 
llOR. Eavesdropper 140 listens to the transmission over a 
noisier, independent A WGN channel and tries to reconstruct 
50 the message Ms. Eavesdropper 140 is assumed to be passive, 
and thus not allowed to transmit data, so as to jam or interfere 
in the communication between transmitter 11 OT and receiver 
llOR. 
Let an average bit-error-rate (BER) over the estimate M:Bs 
55 of receiver llOR be P/ and let an average BER over the 
estimate MBs of eavesdropper 140 be Pe E. It is desired that P / 
be sufficiently low to ensure reliability and that Pe Ebe high. 
When peE is close to 0.5 and the errors are independent and 
identically distributed, then eavesdropper 140 will not be able 
60 to extract much information from the received sequence zn. 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a transmitter device and a 
receiver device utilizing low-density parity-check (LDPC) 
codes to provide secure communication. System 100 includes 
two "friendly parties": device llOT, operating as a transmit-
ter; and llOR, operating as a receiver. A person of ordinary 65 
skill in the art would understand that some embodiments of 
device 110 have both transmitter and receiver functionality. 
This means that, for fixed P B (""O) and P . E (""O) the 
following holds: e.max e.mm 
a) P/~Pe.ma/ (reliability), 
b) peE~pe.minE (security). 
Let SNRB.min be the lowest signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for 
which condition a) holds, and let SNRE.max and be the highest 
SNR for which condition b) holds. It is assumed that receiver 
US 8,484,545 B2 
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HOR operates at SNRB,min and that the SNR of eavesdropper 
140 is strictly lower than SNRB,min' 
The quantity SNRB,mi)SNRE,max is referred to herein as 
the "security gap". The security gap is alternatively expressed 
in dB. The size of the security gap in dB describes the mini-
mum required difference between the SNR ofreceiver HOR 
and the SNR of eavesdropper 140 to ensure secure commu-
nication. Conventional error correcting codes require large 
(more than approximately 20 dB) security gaps when 10 
P e,min E>0.4. In contrast, the coding scheme described below 
exhibits a relatively small security gap. 
FIG. 2 is a graph illustrating the concept of the security gap. 
Curve 210 shows BER versus SNR performance of an 
example error correction code. SNRB,min is the reliability 15 
threshold 220, i.e., the threshold which ensures reliability 
between transmitter HOT and receiver HOR. SNRE,max is the 
security threshold 230, i.e., the threshold at which eavesdrop-
per 140 has an appropriately high error rate (e.g., 0.5) to 
ensure security. The security gap discussed above can be seen 20 
in FIG. 2 as area 240, corresponding to the area of code 
performance which is neither secure enough nor sufficiently 
reliable. The error correcting coding scheme described herein 
is specifically designed to generate codes having a perfor-
mance curve with a small security gap, thus ensuring that a 25 
small difference in signal quality results in a transition from 
the reliable region to the secure region. 
The coding scheme disclosed herein uses a particular class 
of error correcting code known as low-density parity-check 30 (LDPC) codes. The decoder used by both receiver HOR and 
eavesdropper 140 is assumed to be a belief propagation 
decoder, which is asymptotically equal to the powerful bit-
wise maximum a-posteriori (MAP) decoder. Transmitting 
messages over punctured bits can significantly reduce secu- 35 
rity gaps and can thus be efficiently used for increased secu-
rity of data. Security gaps as low as few dB are sufficient to 
force eavesdropper 140 to operate at BER above 0.49. As will 
be described in more detail in connection with FIG. 5, this 
coding scheme, which provides security at the physical layer, 40 
can be used in conjunction with existing cryptographic 
schemes which operate on higher layers of the protocol stack. 
4 
Another parameter that describes an LPDC is the reliability 
threshold (220 in FIG. 2). A code's reliability threshold is 
defined as the lowest SNR at which the belief propagation 
decoder can yield arbitrarily low BERs. 
A punctured LDPC code is a code where some of the 
variable nodes are not transmitted. A puncturing pattern dis-
tribution 
d, 
rr(x) = 2=rrixi-l 
i=2 
describes how an LDPC is punctured, where it, denotes the 
fraction of variable nodes of degree i that are punctured. This 
form of puncturing pattern distribution is useful for an asymp-
totic analysis of punctured LDPC codes. Let p denote the 
fraction of all punctured bits, so that 
The coding scheme disclosed herein transmits messages 
over punctured bits. The puncturing pattern distribution is 
selected so that no subset of punctured bits forms a stopping 
set; otherwise, some punctured (message) bits would not be 
recoverable in the decoder. 
Let the dimension of an LDPC code bed, let the number of 
message bits bes, and let the number of transmitted codeword 
bits be n. The code rate is defined as 
d 
Rd=-. 
n 
(Eq. 1) 
An LDPC code can be specified by means of a bipartite 
graph, composed of variable nodes representing codeword 
bits and check nodes representing the constraints imposed on 
the codeword bits. One parameter that describes the bipartite 
graph of an LDPC code is the degree distribution, which is 
given in the form of two polynomials 
45 while the secrecy rate is defined as 
and 
d, 
A(x) = 2=-';xi-! 
i=2 
d, 
p(x) = 2=p;x'-1 . 
i=2 
The values dv and de represent the maximum variable and 
check node degrees, while A., and p, denote the fractions of 
edges connected to variable and check nodes of degree i, 
respectively. From the node perspective, the fraction of vari-
able nodes of degree i is denoted by A., where 
50 
s 
Rs=-. 
n 
(Eq. 2) 
It is possible, in some scenarios, that the number of punc-
tured (message) bits is smaller than d. In such cases, punc-
tured message bits are coupled with some randomly chosen 
d=y bits to occupy all independent bit locations in a code-
55 word. Usually in such cases Rs <Rd. If a code is left unpunc-
tured, and assuming that all independent bit locations carry 
messages, then Rs =Rd. 
As discussed above, specially designed punctured LDPC 
codes can exploit the security gap between the friendly and 
60 eavesdropper channels, to provide acceptable security with-
out the unnecessary complexity. As noted above, an LDPC 
code can be described in terms of a puncturing pattern distri-
bution and a degree distribution. A system and method for 
designing a security gap LPDC will now be described. 
65 Reduced security gap encoder 170 then implements one or 
more of these codes. The method, and the system which 
implements the method, optimizes the puncturing pattern 
US 8,484,545 B2 
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distribution for LPDCs having a relatively large block length 
(on the orderof 50,000 bits or more). Although such codes are 
finite in length, asymptotic results are likely to hold for these 
very long codes, as with codes of infinite length. 
The method, and system which implements the method, 
involves iteratively selecting an optimized puncturing pattern 
distribution for a code with a given degree distribution. While 
iterating, the reliability and security thresholds of the current 
code under consideration are calculated. The method keeps 
the code with the lowest security gap encountered so far. 10 
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of system for iteratively selecting 
an optimized puncturing pattern distribution, according to 
some embodiments. System 300 includes: a degree distribu-
tion selector 310; a puncturing pattern distribution selector 
320; a reliability threshold calculator 330; a security thresh- 15 
old calculator 340; a security gap calculator 350; and a best 
code store 360. System 300 begins operation by selecting two 
parameters describing the code to be generated. Degree dis-
tribution selector 310 selects the code's degree distribution, 
while puncturing pattern distribution selector 320 selects an 20 
initial puncturing pattern distribution. The degree distribution 
will remain constant while the puncturing pattern distribution 
is varied during the selection process. The selection by degree 
distribution selector 310 is not specific to the design of the 
security gap LPDC, so any criteria relevant to error correcting 25 
codes can be used. As will be discussed shortly, puncturing 
pattern distribution selector 320 is guided by previous itera-
tions. 
The degree distribution and the initial puncturing pattern 
distribution are supplied to reliability threshold calculator 30 
330, and to security threshold calculator 340. Each calculator 
block uses these inputs to perform its respective calculation of 
the current code's threshold. In some embodiments, reliabil-
ity threshold calculator 330 and security threshold calculator 
340 each use density evolution to determine the asymptotic 35 
bit-error rate of the current code under consideration. As 
should be appreciated by a person of ordinary skill in the art, 
density evolution tracks the evolution of the probability den-
sity function (PDF) of messages as they are passed between 
variable and check nodes during the decoding process. A 40 
simplified form of density evolution assumes that messages 
have Gaussian probability distribution functions, so that den-
sity evolution can be reduced to tracking only one parameter: 
the mean mu (k). 
The reliability threshold and the security threshold calcu- 45 
lated by reliability threshold calculator 330 and security 
threshold calculator 340, respectively, are provided to secu-
rity gap calculator 350, which calculates security gap 240, 
i.e., the difference between these thresholds. The calculated 
security gap 240 for the current code under consideration is 50 
provided to best code store 360. Best code store 360 remem-
bers the code with the lowest security gap 240 as the iterations 
progress. In some embodiments, best code store 360 remem-
bers the code by storing the current puncturing pattern distri-
bution. This is sufficient because the other parameter defining 55 
the code (the degree distribution) is fixed at the start. 
In some embodiments, best code store 360 performs an 
explicit comparison of the current puncturing pattern distri-
bution and the remembered puncturing pattern distribution, 
and replaces the remembered distribution with the current 60 
distribution if the current distribution has a lesser security gap 
value. In some embodiments, best code store 360 obtains the 
current puncturing pattern distribution from puncturing pat-
tern distribution selector 320. 
Having generated a first code based on the initial punctur- 65 
ing pattern distribution pattern, system 300 starts another 
iteration to generate another code having a different punctur-
6 
ing pattern distribution. In this next iteration, puncturing pat-
tern distribution selector 320 uses security gap 240 calculated 
by security threshold calculator 340 (representing the perfor-
mance of the last code) and the history of previously chosen 
puncturing pattern distributions to guide selection of the next 
puncturing pattern distribution. In some embodiments, punc-
turing pattern distribution selector 320 uses differential evo-
lution to choose the next puncturing pattern distribution. 
This next iteration proceeds as described above, using the 
same initial degree distribution but a newly selected punctur-
ing pattern distribution. If the next iteration produces a code 
with a lower security gap 240 than the first code, best code 
store 360 replaces the first code with the new code. Other-
wise, the first code remains in best code store 360 unless and 
until a better code is found. 
Having described a system and method for selecting an 
asymptotic LPDC code with a reduced gap, a theoretical 
framework will now be described. The asymptotic analysis 
used below demonstrates that that transmitting messages are 
transmitted over punctured bits significantly reduces the 
security gap. Message in the belief propagation decoder are 
assumed to be Gaussian, so that the mean value of check-to-
variable node messages in the k-th iteration is 
(Eq. 3) 
where 
dv dv 
e(k) - '\',Lor ·(l -p(l - e(k-ll)) eC0l - '\'kn· m - 2/CT2 
- L..J J J ' - L..J I I• UQ -
)=2 i=2 
and a2 is the noise variance. 
Using m}kl, the BER over all variable nodes in the k-th 
iteration is 
(Eq. 4) 
(k) tmu d, j (Ff(k)) 
= IA;'ll"JIX; Q -2- + 
)=2 i=O j 
. (k) ) tmu +mu0 
2 . 
The first term, Pei (kl, is the contribution from the punctured 
variable nodes, while the second, Pe
2
Ckl, is the contribution 
from the unpunctured variable nodes. Thus, ifthe fraction of 
US 8,484,545 B2 
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punctured nodes is p, the average BER over punctured nodes 
IS 
pk)= !_pk) 
e,p p q 
(Eq. 5) 5 
8 
The puncturing algorithm described below starts with an 
initial unpunctured code (mother code) and selects a particu-
lar puncturing pattern distribution for the initial code, by 
selecting particular nodes to be punctured variable nodes. The 
algorithm selects a desirable puncturing pattern distribution 
by first minimizing the number of k-SR nodes, where 
1 <=k<=K. This first minimization results in a code which 
"confuses" the eavesdropper with a low SNR. Then, for k>K 
the number ofk-SR nodes is maximized, which results in a and can be computed at arbitrary SNRs, both above and below 
the threshold. 
As noted above, security gaps 240 can be attained by using 
puncturing distributions that are specifically designed to 
improve security. With the theoretical framework described 
above, optimization of puncturing distributions can be 
described as follows. Let SNRE be the maximum SNR for 
which p e,p (k)~p e E for any k. Let SNRB be the threshold of the 
punctured code. Then, for a given degree distribution (f..(x), 
p(x)) and puncturing fraction p, the problem at hand is: 
10 code which "helps" the friendly listener with a high SNR. The 
number K is chosen to be large enough that the error recovery 
probability at the eavesdropper's SNR is close to saturation. 
Typically, K is 2 or 3. 
FIG. 4 is a flow chart describing in more detail the punc-
15 turing algorithm to produce codes that provide security at 
finite block lengths, according to some embodiments. The 
process 400 begins at block 410, where a variable k is initial-
ized to 1. At block 420, a k-SR node is chosen, using a 
minimized k-SR criterion, to be a punctured variable node. In 
. SNRs 
argmm--
Jrjs SNRE 
20 this regard, the nodes in the code's graph are examined to find 
k-SR nodes and selected nodes are marked in some way as 
"punctured" nodes (e.g., type field, boolean field, or other 
mechanisms as appreciated by persons of ordinary skill in the 
subject to 25 
0 S lri S 1 for all 2 S i S dv, 
art). 
Block 420 selects a k-SR node using a criterion which 
minimizes the overall number of selected k-SR nodes when 
the algorithm finishes. One minimization criterion is as fol-
lows. A k-SR variable node can be found if there exists a 
check node whose neighbors are either unpunctured or I-SR, 
SNRs <co, 
SNRE >-co. 
30 where l<k. Such a check node is referred to herein as a 
recovery check node. A selection criterion which minimizes 
the number ofk-SR nodes is to choose (each time block 420 
is performed) from all unpunctured variable nodes, a variable 
node with the most recovery check nodes to be a punctured 
35 variable node. 
The sections above describe the design of reduced security 
gap LPDC codes with relatively block lengths. The perfor-
mance of such codes was also analyzed. A system and method 
of designing reduced security gap LPDC codes having much 40 
smaller block lengths will now be described. In particular, a 
puncturing algorithm for security at finite block lengths will 
be disclosed. Reduced security gap encoder 170 then imple-
ments one or more of codes designed by the algorithm. As 
noted above, in an environment involving two friendly parties 45 
HOT, HOR and an eavesdropper 140, a code with good 
error-correcting performance is desired for receiver HOR. Yet 
at the same time, the code's error-correcting performance for 
eavesdropper 140 is desired to be very bad when eavesdrop-
per 140 operates with a lower SNR. The puncturing algorithm 50 
described below makes this tradeoff in an efficient mamier. 
Before describing the puncturing algorithm, a brief review 
of LPDC decoding will be presented. However, a person of 
ordinary skill in the art is expected to be familiar with this 
terminology. An LDPC code can be described by a sparse 55 
bipartite graph which includes variable nodes and check 
nodes. This graph is used by iterative message passing algo-
rithm (e.g., belief propagation) uses the graph to decode an 
LPDC. At each round, the received message is passed from 
variable nodes to check nodes, and from check nodes back to 60 
variable nodes. A variable node corresponding to a punctured 
bit (a "punctured variable node") is recovered when it 
receives a non-zero message from at least one of its neigh-
boring check nodes for the first time. A check node that 
provides the first non-zero message is called the survived 65 
check node. A punctured variable node is referred to ask-step 
recoverable (k-SR) if it is recovered in the k-th iteration. 
Block 430 determines whether any more k-SR nodes exist 
in the code graph. IfYes, processing continues at block 420 
with other k-SR nodes. When all k-SR nodes have been 
examined for the current value of k, processing moves to 
block 440, where k is incremented. Next, block 450 compares 
k to K. If k<=K, the process repeats starting at block 420, 
where a k-SR nodes is selected again using a minimized k-SR 
criteria, but with a new value of k. If block 450 determines 
instead that k>K, the loop ends. At this point, the number of 
k-SR nodes has been minimized for 1 <=k<=K. 
With k being K+l after exiting the loop, processing con-
tinues at block 460 where k-SR nodes are maximized. Per-
sons of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate various meth-
ods of maximizing the overall number of selected k-SR 
nodes, such as the grouping algorithm. Block 470 determines 
whether any more k-SR nodes exist in the code graph. IfYes, 
processing continues at block 460 with over k-SR nodes. 
When all k-SR nodes have been examined for the current 
value ofk, processing moves to block 480, where k is incre-
mented. Block 490 determines whether any more punctured 
nodes can be found. If yes, processing repeats starting at 
block 460, where k-SR nodes are maximized again, but with 
a new value ofk. If no more punctured nodes can be found, the 
process 400 ends. At this point, the numberofk-SR nodes has 
been maximized for k>K and minimized for 1 <=k<=K. 
The arrangement of punctured variable nodes in the tripar-
tite graph describes the puncturing pattern distribution of the 
LPDC. Punctured variable nodes can be described in terms of 
how many steps it takes the decoder to recover the encoded 
information, where a k-step recoverable (k-SR) node is 
recovered in the k-th iteration. Selecting punctured variable 
nodes in the graph to minimize the total number of some k-SR 
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nodes (those for 1 <=k<=K) and to maximize the total number 
of other k-SR nodes (those for k>K) produces a code which 
confuses the eavesdropper while helping the friendly 
receiver. 
In some embodiments, the algorithm is run more than once 
to select more than one puncturing pattern distribution for the 
same initial (mother) code. Using more than one puncturing 
pattern distribution allows the secrecy rate and the security 
gap to be adapted at run time. Generally, the secrecy gap 
decreases with as the security rate decreases. This can be 10 
advantageous in dynamic environments where the relation-
ship between the friendly receiver and the eavesdropper can 
vary over time. That is, sometimes an eavesdropper manages 
10 
which includes secure physical layer 510, link layer 520, and 
additional layer 530. System 500 takes advantage of the pres-
ence of reduced security gap encoder 170, which provides 
security, within physical layer 510. In this embodiment, secu-
rity provided at the physical layer replaces cryptographic 
algorithms at a higher layer (e.g., wired equivalent privacy 
(WEP) at the media access control (MAC) layer, internet 
protocol security (IPSec) at the network layer, secure sockets 
layer (SSL) at the application layer, etc.) 
The coding techniques disclosed herein do provide secu-
rity at the physical layer, but these techniques can also be used 
in combination with any protocol layer above the physical 
layer. Thus, some embodiments of transmitter llOT and 
receiver llOR (not shown) combine encryption at higher to come 'close' to the signal and consequently receives it with 
a better SNR, while other times it doesn't. 
In some embodiments, all punctured nodes carry messages 
and the pattern itself is changed. In other embodiments, the 
pattern is the same for all secrecy rates while messages are 
transmitted only over a subset of messages. Priority is given 
to those punctured nodes with high levels of recoverability. 
15 layers of the protocol stack with the security provided by 
reduced security gap encoder 170 at the physical layer. 
FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating selected components 
of one embodiment of secure physical layer 510. A transmit 
secure physical layer 510T includes a framer 610, reduced 
Having described a system and method which implements 
a puncturing algorithm to produce codes that provide security 
20 security gap encoder 170, and a modulator 620. Framer 610 
operates on a message 605 from a higher protocol layer. 
Message 605 is a stream of bits. Framer 610 divides the bit 
stream into blocks, and outputs a block 615, which may 
include header and trailer information. Block 615 is encoded at finite block lengths, a theoretical framework for under-
standing the performance of such codes will now be 
described. The recovery error Per is used to explore the trade-
off between the conflicting goals of a code with good error-
correcting performance for receiver llOR but bad error-cor-
recting performance for eavesdropper 140. The formula for 
Per over an additive white noise Gaussian (A WGN) channel is 
30 
25 by reduced security gap encoder 170. Reduced security gap 
encoder 170 produces one or more encoded bits 625. Encoded 
bits 625 are modulated by modulator 620 to produce symbols, 
which are transmitted over main channel 120 to a receiver 
(Eq. 6) 
with secure physical layer 510R. 
Receive secure physical layer 510R includes a demodula-
tor 630, reduced security gap decoder 180, and a framer 640. 
Symbols received on main channel 120 are mapped to bits 
645 by demodulator 63 0, and bits 645 are decoded by reduced 
security gap decoder 180. The group of decoded bits 655 is 
where 
35 received by framer 640, which strips off header/trailer bits as 
necessary to reveal originally transmitted message 605. Mes-
sage 605 may then be passed up to a higher protocol layer. 
Notably, message 605 is reconstructed without the transmis-
¢(x) = 1 - 1; {4;; r 1anh~e-(u-x12 / 4x d/u JR 2 40 
sion of any bits of the original message in the clear. 
In some embodiments, one side of the communication 
channel has less processing or computing capabilities than 
the other. In some embodiments, the properties of the com-
munication channel may be asymmetrical (e.g., 10 Mbit/sec 
in one direction and 1 Mbit/sec in the other). In such embodi-
forx>Oandcp(x)=l forx=O, p2 is the noise variance, Q() is the 
Q-function, and S(v) is the number ofunpunctured nodes in 
the recovery tree ofv. 45 ments, one side may use different modulation and/or framing 
techniques when transmitting than the other side does. As a 
non-limiting example, one side may transmit using quadra-
ture amplitude modulation with 16 different symbols 
(QAM16) while the other side may transmit using quadrature 
These equations can be used to explore the behavior of 
recovery error probability per(v) in terms of the number of 
unpunctured variable nodes S(v) at different SNRs. When the 
SNR is high (as on the friendly receiver's channel 120), the 
growth of recovery error probability is almost linear, and is 
relatively slow with respect to the size of the recovery tree. On 
the other hand, at low SNRs (as on the eavesdropper's chan-
nel 150) the growth of recovery error probability becomes 
exponential and saturates increasingly fast. In the region 
where recovery error probability for the eavesdropper is not 55 
saturated, increasing the number of nodes in the recovery tree 
50 amplitude modulation with 64 different symbols (QAM64). 
is then expected to have a higher impact on the performance 
of eavesdropper 140 than on the performance of receiver 
llOR. In contrast, when recovery error probability at eaves-
dropper 140 is close to saturation, increasing the number of 60 
nodes does seem reasonable, since the performance of eaves-
dropper 140 is already at levels where it can not deteriorate 
much further while the performance offriendly receiver 11 OR 
suffers. 
FIG. 5 is a logical block diagram of a system 500 with a 65 
secure physical layer, according to some embodiments. Sys-
tem 500 includes transmitter 11 OT and receiver 11 OR, each of 
FIG. 7 is a hardware block diagram of an embodiment of 
device 110. Device 110 contains a number of well known 
components, including a processor 710, a transceiver 720, 
memory 730, and non-volatile storage 740. These compo-
nents are coupled via bus 750. Omitted from FIG. 7 are a 
number of conventional components, known to those skilled 
in the art, that are not necessary to explain the operation of 
device 110. Examples of non-volatile storage include, for 
example, a hard disk, flash RAM, flash ROM, EPROM, etc. 
Transceiver 720 may support one or more of a variety of 
different networks using various technologies, media, speeds, 
etc. A non-limiting list of examples of wireless technologies 
includes: radio frequency identification (RFID) networks 
(e.g., ISO 14443, ISO 18000-6); wireless local area networks 
(e.g. IEEE 802.11, commonly known as WiFi); wireless wide 
area networks (e.g., IEEE 802.16, commonly known as 
WiMAX); wireless personal area networks (e.g., Blue-
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tooth™, IEEE 802.15.4) and wireless telephone networks 
(e.g., CDMA, GSM, GPRS, EDGE). 
12 
ment the methods of selecting puncturing pattern distribu-
tions as described herein. Alternatively, these methods of 
selecting puncturing pattern distributions can be imple-
mented in digital hardware logic. As yet another alternative, 
these methods of selecting puncturing pattern distributions 
can be implemented in a combination of software and digital 
hardware logic. 
Any process descriptions or blocks in flowcharts would be 
understood as representing modules, segments, or portions of 
In the embodiment of FIG. 7, reduced security gap encoder 
170 and reduced security gap decoder 180 are implemented in 
software, i.e., instructions that are retrieved from a memory 
and then executed by processor 710. Processor 710 may take 
the form of, for example, a microprocessor, network proces-
sor, microcontroller, reconfigurable processor, extensible 
processor, graphics processor, etc.). Memory 730 contains 
encoder instructions 760 and/or decoder instructions 770, 
which programs or enables processor 710 to implement the 
functions of reduced security gap encoder 170 and/or reduced 
security gap decoder 180. 
Some embodiments of reduced security gap encoder 170 
and reduced security gap decoder 180 are stored on a com-
puter-readable medium, which in the context of this disclo-
sure refers to any structure which can contain, store, or 
embody instructions executable by a processor. The computer 
readable medium can be, for example but not limited to, based 
on electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or 
semiconductor technology. Specific examples of a computer-
readable medium using electronic technology would include 
(but are not limited to) the following: a random access 
memory (RAM); a read-only memory (ROM); and an eras-
able programmable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash 
memory). A specific example using magnetic technology 
includes (but is not limited to) a disk drive; and a portable 
computer diskette. Specific examples using optical technol-
ogy include (but are not limited to) a compact disk read-only 
memory (CD-ROM) or a digital video disk read-only 
memory (DVD-ROM). 
10 code which include one or more executable instructions for 
implementing specific functions or steps in the process. As 
would be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art of the 
software development, alternate implementations are also 
included within the scope of the present invention as defined 
15 by the claims. In these alternate implementations, functions 
may be executed out of order from that shown or discussed, 
including substantially concurrently or in reverse order, 
depending on the functionality involved. 
The foregoing description has been presented for purposes 
20 of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaus-
tive or to limit the disclosure to the precise forms disclosed. 
Obvious modifications or variations are possible in light of 
the above teachings. The implementations discussed, how-
ever, were chosen and described to illustrate the principles of 
25 the disclosure and its practical application to thereby enable 
one of ordinary skill in the art to utilize the disclosure in 
various implementations and with various modifications as 
are suited to the particular use contemplated. All such modi-
fications and variation are within the scope of the disclosure 
30 as determined by the appended claims when interpreted in 
accordance with the breadth to which they are fairly and 
legally entitled. In some embodiments (not shown), reduced security gap 
encoder 170 and reduced security gap decoder 180 are imple-
mented in digital hardware logic, as encoding logic and 
decoding logic. Technologies used to implement encoding 35 
logic and decoding logic include, but are not limited to, a 
programmable logic device (PLD), a programmable gate 
array (PGA), field programmable gate array (FPGA), an 
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a system on 
chip (SoC), and a system in package (SiP). Such digital logic 40 
implementations are not limited to pure digital but may also 
include analog sections or components. 
Furthermore, embodiments of device 110 which imple-
ment reduced security gap encoder 170 and reduced security 
gap decoder 180 with digital logic may also contain software 45 
to implement functions such as management, initialization of 
hardware, protocol stack layers, etc. In yet another embodi-
ment of device 110 (not illustrated), reduced security gap 
encoder 170 and/or reduced security gap decoder 180 are 
implemented by a combination of software (i.e., instructions 50 
executed on a processor) and hardware logic. 
FIG. 7 depicts a communication device 110 that uses a 
puncture code to provide security, where the puncture code is 
designed and/or selected in accordance with the techniques 
described above in connection with FIGS. 1-5. The design 55 
techniques described in connection with FIGS. 1-5 are imple-
mented on a computer which contains conventional compo-
nents (such as those shown in FIG. 7), except that some 
embodiments of the computer used to design the code are not 
required to include a transceiver, since the computer that 60 
generates the code used in a communications device is not 
required to transmit or receive using the code. 
In this regard, the methods of selecting puncturing pattern 
distributions described herein can be implemented in soft-
ware, i.e., as instructions that are retrieved from a memory 65 
and then executed by a processor. The memory then contains 
instructions which program or enable the processor to imp le-
The invention claimed is: 
1. A method, implemented in a computer, of selecting a 
puncturing pattern for a low density parity check (LDPC) 
code, the method comprising: 
selecting, by a processor in the computer, a puncturing 
pattern distribution for the LDPC code; 
calculating a security threshold and a reliability threshold 
for the LDPC, the LDPC having the selected puncturing 
pattern distribution and also described by a degree dis-
tribution; 
storing the selected puncturing pattern distribution respon-
sive to a security gap for the LDPC being a lowest value 
encountered in any prior iterations; 
selecting another puncturing pattern distribution for the 
LDPC code; and 
repeating the calculating, the storing, and the selecting 
another puncturing pattern distribution steps. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the repeating ceases 
when the stored puncturing pattern distribution drops below a 
predetermined threshold. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the selecting the another 
puncturing pattern distribution for the LDPC code comprises 
selecting the another puncturing pattern distribution based at 
least on performance of previously selected puncturing pat-
tern distributions. 
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising calculating 
the security gap as a difference between the security threshold 
and the reliability threshold. 
5. The method of claim 1, further comprising selecting the 
degree distribution. 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the selecting another 
puncturing pattern distribution further comprises using dif-
ferential evolution to guide the selection of the another punc-
turing pattern distribution. 
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7. The method of claim 1, wherein the selecting another 
puncturing pattern distribution further comprises optimizing 
the selecting using a linear programming algorithm. 
8. A computer apparatus configured to select a puncturing 
pattern for a low density parity check (LDPC) code, the 
computer apparatus comprising: 
memory; and 
a processor configured by instructions stored in the 
memory to: 
(a) select a puncture pattern distribution for the LDPC 10 
code; 
14 
12. The method of claim 11, wherein the choosing one of 
the k-SR nodes using the minimized k-SR criterion com-
prises: 
marking the chosen k-SR node as a punctured variable 
node. 
. 1~. T~e m~thod of claim 12, wherein the puncturing pattern 
d1stnbut10n 1s described by an arrangement of punctured 
variable nodes. 
14. The method of claim 11, further comprising: 
responsive to all of the k-SR nodes having been examined 
for minimization of a current value of and to the incre-
mented k not meeting or exceeding K, repeating the 
choosing using the minimized k-SR criterion. 
(b) calculate a security threshold and a reliability thresh-
old for the LDPC, the LDPC having the selected 
puncture pattern distribution and also described by a 
degree distribution; 
15._T.he.method of claim 11, wherein the choosing using 
15 the m1mm1zed k-SR criterion comprises: 
( c) calculate a security gap between the security thresh-
old and the reliability threshold; 
repeat (b) and ( c) after selecting another puncture pat-
tern distribution for the LDPC code; and 
output the selected puncture pattern distribution having 20 
a lowest security gap. 
9 .. The computer apparatus of claim 8, wherein the proces-
sor 1s further configured by the instructions to select the 
another puncture pattern distribution based at least on perfor-
mance of previously selected puncture pattern distributions. 25 
10. The computer apparatus of claim 8, wherein the pro-
cessor is further configured by the instructions to calculate the 
security gap as a difference between the security threshold 
and the reliability threshold. 
11. ~ met~o~, i~plemented in a computer, of selecting a 30 
punctunng d1stnbut10n pattern for a low density parity check 
(LDP~) code, the LPDC described by a graph containing a 
plurality of nodes, at least some of the nodes being k-SR 
nodes, the method comprising: 
initial~zing, by a processor in the computer, an iteration 35 
varrnble k to 1; 
choosing one of the k-SR nodes using a minimized k-SR 
criterion; 
when all of the k-SR nodes have been examined for mini-
mization of a current value of k, incrementing k and 40 
comparing the incremented k to a maximum value K 
when the incremented k exceeds K, choosing one of the 
k-SR nodes using a maximized k-SR criterion; 
when all of the k-SR nodes have been examined for mini-
mization of a current value of k, incrementing k and 45 
determining whether all puncture nodes have been 
examined; and 
when all the puncture nodes have not been examined 
repeating the choosing using the maximized k-SR crite~ 
rion. 
choosing, from all unpunctured variable nodes in the 
graph, a variable node with more recovery check nodes 
than any other node. 
16. The method of claim 11, wherein the choosing using 
the maximized k-SR criterion uses a grouping algorithm. 
. 1 ~.A ~omputer apparatus configured to select a puncturing 
d1stnbut10n pattern for a low density parity check (LDPC) 
code, the LPDC described by a graph containing a plurality of 
nodes, at least some of the nodes being k-step recoverable 
(k-SR) nodes, the computer apparatus comprising: 
memory; and 
a processor configured by instructions stored m the 
memory to: 
minimize the number ofk-SR nodes for a value k where 
1 <=k<=K; and ' 
after the minimization, maximize the number of k-SR 
nodes for the value k, where k>K. 
18. ~e computer apparatus of claim 17, wherein the pro-
cessor 1s further configured to minimize by selecting some of 
the k-SR nodes to be punctured variable nodes while mini-
mizing the number ofk-SR nodes for 1 <=k<=K. 
19. ~e computer apparatus of claim 17, wherein the pro-
cessor 1s further configured to maximize by selecting other of 
the k-SR nodes to be punctured variable nodes while maxi-
mizing the number ofk-SR nodes for k>K. 
20. ~e computer apparatus of claim 17, wherein the pro-
cessor 1s further configured to minimize by selecting some of 
the k-SR nodes to be punctured variable nodes while mini-
mizing the number of k-SR nodes for 1 <=k<=K and the 
processor is further configured to maximize by 'selecting 
other of the k-SR nodes to be punctured variable nodes while 
maximizing the number ofk-SR nodes for k>K, wherein the 
puncturing pattern distribution is described by the arrange-
ment of the punctured variable nodes. 
* * * * * 
